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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
CHOPPING DOWN THE RAINFOREST: FINDING A 
SOLUTION TO THE “AMAZON PROBLEM” 
Eric Andrew Felleman* 
Current economic conditions in the United States have led to a 
dramatic decrease in state tax revenue.1 Without these funds, 
states will be unable to support important public services, and 
hundreds of thousands of jobs in the public and private sectors are 
at risk of being cut, as states work to close $103 billion in budget 
gaps.2 Accomplishing that will involve overcoming many hurdles, 
such as the unpopularity of raising taxes during times of 
economic trouble, but one largely untapped source could provide 
a significant amount of income to states. States currently lose 
around $23 billion annually in uncollected use taxes,3 about half 
of which likely would have come from transactions with Web 
retailers.4 Use taxes act as an adjunct to sales taxes on purchased 
goods and services that are not subject to sales taxes.5 But because 
this tax is voluntarily collected from the consumer instead of the 
retailer, compliance is extremely low.6 
As a significant number of transactions only taxed by a use tax 
occur between in-state consumers and online retailers such as 
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Amazon.com,7 the increasing dominance of e-commerce over 
brick and mortar retail has given rise to a major threat to a long-
established and relatively stable mechanism for providing states 
with tax revenue. But the states’ tools to address this issue have 
been severely limited by a nearly twenty-year-old Supreme Court 
decision that imposes an antiquated bright-line rule over sales tax 
imposition, leaving states to choose between legislative options 
that are either ineffective, overly costly, or unconstitutional.8 
Meanwhile, an inactive Congress has repeatedly failed to enact 
legislation that would address this issue. 
Federal legislation that unifies and clarifies interstate sales tax 
policies would be both effective and constitutional, but courts 
should reexamine the merits and logic of Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota. An easing of the bright-line requirement of a physical 
presence to constitute a sufficient nexus would likely spur 
Congressional action that would address concerns that national 
retailers have about being exposed to sales tax obligations. 
THE QUILL CONUNDRUM 
Quill attempted to clarify the oft-changing law regarding 
when states could require out-of-state businesses to collect use 
taxes on sales to in-state consumers. Acknowledging a shift away 
from formalistic jurisprudence in this area in recent years,9 the 
Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional requirement of 
purposeful availment was easily met in this and similar cases.10 
But while the Due Process Clause may not have been offended, 
the Court ultimately concluded that a state instead runs afoul of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and unduly burdens interstate 
commerce if it taxes a business that lacks a “physical presence” in 
the state.11 The Court folds this rule into the first inquiry of the 
four-part test for constitutionality of a tax under the Commerce 
Clause introduced in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady: whether a 
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tax is “applied to an activity with a 'substantial nexus' with the 
taxing State.”12 
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Stewart emphasized 
that the requirements of the Dormant Commerce Clause are 
animated by “structural concerns about the effects of state 
regulation on the national economy” and the need to protect 
against the types of restrictions on interstate commerce that 
proved cancerous under the Articles of Confederation.13 But states, 
in seeking to tax purchases from out-of-state merchants, are not 
attempting to gain an unfair advantage for in-state businesses. 
Rather, they are trying to correct out-of-state businesses’ 
advantage over in-state businesses. Surely the law, and those who 
apply it, can distinguish between a tax that discriminates against 
foreign businesses from one that treats them no differently from 
businesses that physically exist within the state.14 
Such a standard is perhaps not as predictable as some would 
like, and the Court in Quill put much stock in the value of a clear 
rule over the potential dangers of 'artificiality.' Specifically, the 
court believed that this decision would “firmly establish[] the 
boundaries of legitimate state authority...and reduce litigation 
concerning...taxes” as well as “encourage[] settled 
expectations...foster[ing] investment by business and individuals.”15 
In the years since Quill, the artificiality of this rule has only 
become clearer16 while the supposed benefits have remained 
murky. The boundaries of state authority may indeed be clearer 
today, but they are certainly not unlitigated.17 And whatever 
clarity we have gained has come at a price. States are forced to 
accept the loss of huge sums of revenue due to being unable to 
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implement a taxation scheme motivated not by prejudice against 
interstate commerce but a desire to receive payment from 
transactions that benefit from their own laws and infrastructure. 
It is true, of course, that this rule has succeeded in 
encouraging the development of interstate business, and there 
may be economic justifications for a rule that privileges national 
retailers over local ones. But do those benefits outweigh the 
increasing costs to state resources? As our economy continues to 
shift towards a higher proportion of online transactions, it is worth 
reexamining the value of such a policy.18 
At the end of the day, Quill imposes a hard limit on a state's 
taxing power. But it may also provide hints of its own future 
demise. Stewart suggests that it may be time for a bright-line rule 
to be replaced by a more contextual inquiry when it becomes 
anachronistic, rarely applied by courts, or when there is no strong 
reliance interest that would be upset by abandoning it.19 At the 
time, the court felt this protected the “physical presence” rule, but 
a court examining a similar case today should arrive at the 
opposite conclusion. Arguably already anachronistic when 
enacted,20 the rise of e-commerce has surely supplanted much of 
the traditional understanding of sales that formed the rule’s policy 
foundation. While businesses engaging in interstate commerce 
may claim there is sufficient reliance to maintain the rule, being 
required to pay a tax that in-state businesses are already expected 
to pay does not seem an unfair imposition that must be prevented. 
And while courts have faithfully applied the rule since its 
adoption, it has been applied “as is,” without much further 
development or extension. Quill is an empty branch of law, and it 
would benefit us to chop it off. 
STATE SOLUTIONS AFTER QUILL 
Unable to directly tax out-of-state retailers, states generally 
require purchasers of products and services purchased from these 
                                                   
18. See id. at 329 (“Very questionable is the rationality of perpetuating a rule that 
creates an interstate tax shelter for one form of business...but no countervailing advantage 
for its competitors.”) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
19. Id. at 316-17. 
20. See id. at 328. (“In today's economy, physical presence frequently has very little to 
do with a transaction a State might seek to tax.”) (J. White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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retailers to pay a use tax equal to the sales tax that would be 
imposed normally. A perfect solution, spare one major caveat: 
consumers almost never pay them.21 Efforts have been made to 
improve compliance through education and increased 
enforcement, but both of these solutions cost money, and neither 
has led to much success.22 
North Carolina recently attempted to improve its enforcement 
ability by auditing the identity and purchases of state customers 
who purchased from out-of-state retailers, but this method was 
struck down as unconstitutional, and similar techniques bear 
concerning implications for privacy and free expression.23 
At least fourteen states24 have created laws commonly known 
as “Amazon laws,” crafted to enable the state to tax retailers that 
pay commissions to in-state affiliates (people who link potential 
customer’s to the retailer’s website) even if the retailer does not 
have an in-state physical presence.25 The constitutionality of such 
laws has so far been upheld in New York courts, perhaps 
incorrectly,26 owing to a line of cases decided before Quill that 
considers the presence of contracted sales agents as constituting a 
physical presence in a state.27 But these laws may not survive long 
enough for their constitutionally to be conclusively tested, as the 
standard response by out-of-state retailers is to simply adjust their 
behavior so as not to trigger them.28 
While Quill restricts a state’s ability to directly tax out-of-state 
retailers, Congress possesses the ability to enact legislation that 
would empower the states to do so, and there have been attempts 
to push them to do so. In the early 2000's, a national coalition 
drafted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), 
which was intended to make state tax laws more uniform, and 
thus reduce the “undue burden” on retailers faced with paying 
                                                   
21. Gaylord, supra note 5, at 2017. 
22. Id. at 2025 (mentioning that efforts to inform North Carolineans about their use 
tax obligation have been unsuccessful.). 
23. See id. 
24. See Ferguson, supra note 16, at 1293. 
25. See Daniel Tyler Cowan, New York's Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet, 88 N.C. 
L. REV. 1423, 1434-35 (2010). 
26. See Ferguson, supra note 16. 
27. Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't 
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
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taxes on interstate transactions.29 The drafters hoped that this 
would lead to Congressional action permitting states to require 
these retailers to collect taxes despite having no “physical 
presence” in the state.30 Yet each time this has been proposed in 
Congress, lobbying by Internet and other typically out-of-state 
retailers has led to its defeat.31 Recently, a proposal was introduced 
into Congress in the form of the “Marketplace Fairness Act”32 that 
would allow states to tax transactions with out-of-state retailers if 
they adopted measures to simplify the payment process.33 Amazon 
has lent its support to the proposal, but other online retailers such 
as eBay have opposed it, and its passage through the present 
Congress remains uncertain. 
Internet retailers resist legislation that would require them to 
pay new taxes, as this removes a competitive edge they use to 
maintain lower prices than in-state retailers. Amazon in particular 
has created a corporate structure that maintains a physical 
presence under Quill in as few states as possible, operating only 
non-selling facilities in others.34 It also meticulously tracks its 
sales activity in each state to ensure their employees' actions in a 
state do not activate a state provision requiring collection of tax, 
and limits its activity in states with “aggressive tax offices.”35 
Relaxing the Quill standard would also expose retailers to sales 
tax collection requirements that vary significantly state by state, 
greatly increasing retailers’ compliance costs. For its part, Amazon 
has resisted state legislation while voicing support for a national 
standard set by Congress.36 
However, sales tax collection would not be the death knell of 
the competitive advantage and market share enjoyed by online 
retailers. At least one study has suggested that Amazon would still 
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34. Stu Woo, Amazon Battles States Over Sales Tax, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 3, 
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be able to offer lower prices than its rivals even if it has to pay 
more taxes.37 Smaller outfits may not enjoy the same comfort in 
the market as Amazon, but their alarm will likely be heard loud 
and clear by lawmakers, who would likely be persuaded to 
reconsider legislation imposing a national standard that would 
require consistency between each state's taxation system. This 
would prevent national retailers from the difficulty of complying 
with wildly different taxation schemes in different states. Amazon 
for its part seems to have decided that having to comply with a 
national sales tax scheme is preferable over continued battles with 
state lawmakers.38 
On the flipside, this shift would bring in much-needed revenue 
for states, as well as eliminate an unfair advantage enjoyed by out-
of-state businesses engaged in interstate commerce. It would even 
lessen the disparate impact of sales taxes on lower income 
households, as their wealthier neighbors can no longer avoid taxes 
through Internet shopping.39 
The Quill decision was penned with an eye towards 
encouraging Congress to use its constitutionally granted power to 
regulate interstate commerce to make its own determination of 
the proper limits of a state's ability to tax interstate transactions.40 
Unfortunately, Congress has not done its part, and the antiquated 
physical presence rule continues to poison the ability of states to 
lawfully tax transactions between in-state consumers and Internet 
retailers whose electronic presence in a state weighs just as 
heavily as brick and mortar. The proposed Marketplace Fairness 
Act could address this problem, but its passage is uncertain. There 
is little reason to cling to Quill. We are better served by 
recognizing its obsolescence and forcing Congressional 
involvement than having to tiptoe around it and risk further 
complicating this system. 
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